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Richard H. Snape 
Preferential trading agreements are back in fashion. The purpose of this paper 
is to survey briefly the background to discriminatory trading arrangements and 
the economic effects of some forms of them. It discusses some problems with 
departures from nondiscrimination and proposes a manner in which nondis- 
crimination may be pursued further through the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). 
Following the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in the late 1950s, many new trading 
arrangements were formed among developing countries, but without any no- 
table long-term successes. Meanwhile, the British Commonwealth preference 
system, which had been at the center of dispute during the negotiations over 
the International Trade Organisation  (ITO) and the GATT at the end of the 
Second World War, withered. In the 1970s, more emphasis was given in inter- 
national negotiations to preferences for developing countries and the creation 
of commodity cartels. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the pendulum has swung 
back to the formation of free trade and other preferential trading areas, mainly 
on a regional basis. 
Of particular importance has been the change in attitude of the U.S.  govern- 
ment. Having been discriminated against in the prewar period, during which 
German  and  British  hub-and-spoke  bilateral  systems  dominated  much  of 
world trade, the United States was firmly against allowing discrimination in 
the club that was to become the GATT. It compromised to the extent of agree- 
ing to the continuation  but not the extension of  existing preferences and to 
preferential arrangements that involved essentially free trade among the par- 
ticipants:  customs unions and free trade areas. The United States supported 
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the formation of the EEC for essentially political reasons and in the late 1960s 
reluctantly  agreed to the generalized  system of  preferences  for developing 
countries, negotiated through the GATT. 
In contrast to its earlier position-that  of being clearly the leader in devel- 
oping a nondiscriminatory  trading system-the  United States has been at the 
front in the new  wave of  preferential  trading arrangements, having  granted 
unilateral  preferences  to Caribbean countries  in  1983 and  concluding  free 
trade agreements  with Israel in  1985 and Canada in  1988. Now,  in the early 
1990s, the  Bush  administration  is currently  seeking a free trade agreement 
with Mexico, has indicated that other Latin American countries may be can- 
didates for similar agreements, and has put out feelers in other directions also. 
Over the last nine years, successive U.S. trade representatives have explic- 
itly stated that bilateral and multilateral negotiations would proceed together. 
The position was well stated in the Reagan administration’s statement on trade 
policy  of  23 September 1985: “While  our highest  priority  remains the  im- 
provement  of the world trading system through a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations,  the United States is interested in the possibility of achiev- 
ing further liberalization  of trade and investment through the negotiation of 
bilateral free-trade arrangements such as the one recently concluded with Is- 
rael. We believe that, at times, such agreements could complement our multi- 
lateral efforts and facilitate a higher degree of liberalization, mutually benefi- 
cial to both parties, than would be possible within the multilateral context.” 
While still the secretary of the U.S.  Treasury, James Baker added, “[Our] 
approach is idealistic in aim, but realistic and often incremental in method. It 
seeks to move nations toward a more open trading system through a strategy 
of consistent, complementary, and reinforcing actions on various international 
fronts, bilateral and multilateral.  . . . [The trade agreement with Canada] is 
. . . a lever to achieve more open trade. Other nations are forced to recognize 
that  we will  devise  ways  to expand trade-with  or without  them. If  they 
choose not to open their markets, they will not reap the benefits.”’ 
This statement of  Baker’s threatens the EEC, Japan, and others: join in the 
multilateral negotiations, or the United States will discriminate against you by 
entering  into more favorable trading relationships  with other parties.  Many 
observers question whether this two-track approach can be sustained. Do the 
threat, pursuit, and  negotiation  of  preferential  arrangements stimulate  and 
complement multilateralism  as claimed in Baker’s statement, or do they un- 
dermine it‘? 
Preferences can be explicitly negative as well as positive. Sanctions against 
South Africa, Iran, and Iraq are examples of negative preferences.  Amend- 
ment of the main safeguard provision of the GATT against “fair” trade (Ar- 
1. Remarks made by James Baker to the Canadian Importers and Exporters Associations, To- 
ronto. 22 June 1988. 9  Discrimination, Regionalism, and GATT 
ticle  XIX)  to  allow  discrimination  (“selectivity”)  against  those  countries 
whose exports triggered  the safeguard action was pressed by some countries 
in the Tokyo Round of  multilateral trade negotiations but was resisted. It has 
resurfaced in the Uruguay Round, and it could emerge from it, if the Round 
is completed. The draft of a Safeguards Code (interpretation of Article XIX) 
that was on the table at what was intended to be the final ministerial meeting 
of  the  Uruguay  Round  in  Brussels  in  December  1990 contained  square- 
bracketed  sections that would  have allowed such selectivity “in exceptional 
circumstances  .” 
Probably the most important of explicitly negative preferences are the Sec- 
tion 301 and the now expired Super-301 provisions of the 1988 U.S. Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness  Act  (Bhagwati  and Patrick  1990). Many of  the 
provisions allow for explicit discrimination against other countries in a man- 
ner that is inconsistent with the GATT (both with respect to the nondiscrimi- 
nation provisions  and because the relevant tariffs have been bound) and with 
the position adopted so forcefully by the United States in the negotiations that 
established  the  post-World  War  I1  international  economic  institutions. 
Indeed,  it  is reminiscent  of  the German and  British  policies  of  the  1930s 
(Condliffe 1940, chaps. 4, 8). 
In comparing nondiscriminatory  multilateralism and trade discrimination in 
all its forms, it can be instructive  to recall the role of the price system in  a 
market  economy.  The market  allows (to varying degrees, depending  on the 
nature of the transaction)  the depersonalization  of trading. This has several 
consequences, the foremost economic one being efficiency. Nonmarket  sys- 
tems function  through  obligations, responsibilities,  love, hate, threats,  war, 
queues, cooperation, and favors. This occurs at both the micro level of indi- 
viduals and at the macro level of nations.  Personal and political relationships 
come to the fore: markets help depoliticize transactions nationally and inter- 
nationally.  A corollary  is that nontariff  barriers  to international trade invite 
discrimination and in some forms make it inevitable. Managed trade is politi- 
cal trade. 
It may be that international transactions can never be completely depoliti- 
cized-trade  policy is intertwined  with foreign policy, as Cooper (1987) re- 
minds us. Trade is between “us” and “them” (Kindleberger 1986, 1). There is 
no doubt, however, that the level of politicization is lowest with nondiscrimi- 
natory trade. Preferences granted can be removed, and, to the extent that trade 
policy  is seeking international  political favor, it is likely not to be economi- 
cally efficient. 
1.1  Forms of Barrier Reduction 
Trade  preferences  may  be  given  by  selectively  reducing  trade  barriers 
against the preferred countries or by raising barriers against others. Both tac- 10  Richard H. Snape 
tics were relevant in the discriminatory 1930s;  they are both relevant in today’s 
trading world also, with the threat of  action by the United States in particular 
against countries that it judges not to be playing by the appropriate rules. But 
for the moment I focus on preferences  granted by barrier reduction.  Barrier 
reduction may be undertaken  in a manner that discriminates against countries 
or does not; it may be undertaken as part of a negotiated international agree- 
ment or unilaterally. This gives four possibilities: 
(i)  unilateral nondiscriminatory reductions; 
(ii)  unilateral discriminatory reductions; 
(iii)  internationally negotiated nondiscriminatory reductions; and 
(iv)  internationally negotiated discriminatory reductions. 
In  this list, the GATT allows (i) and (iii), in the latter case provided that the 
reductions or concessions are passed on to all members of  the GATT uncon- 
ditionally. Except for preferences for developing countries, it does not permit 
(ii) and allows (iv) only if the negotiated agreement fulfills what on paper are 
stringent conditions, to which I shall return later. 
Looking at the choice between (i) and (ii), why should a country discrimi- 
nate among other countries if it is receiving nothing in return from those that 
it favors? Given the trade policy of other countries, a country will generally 
gain more in terms of real income from a nondiscriminatory  reduction in its 
trade barriers than from a similar preferential barrier reduction: with nondis- 
crimination it could obtain all the trade creation gains (and more) without the 
trade diversion costs.2 This statement should be qualified for a country  that 
has market power with respect to its imports or exports and where the elastic- 
ities of  supply or demand differ across its trading partners (and the markets 
can  be  segmented). But  the  optimal trade  taxes  necessary  to exploit these 
terms of trade effects are difficult enough to calculate in practice  where the 
rest of  the world is treated as one market. Calculation of  a set of discrimina- 
tory trade taxes that would increase a country’s real income where the rest of 
the world  is treated as a set of  segmented  markets  is a problem of a much 
higher order.  Further,  the products  for which  such discrimination  would be 
most relevant will generally be those over which the producing enterprise it- 
self has market power and for which it will set prices on different markets that 
reflect the differential conditions on those markets. So any qualification of  the 
general statement that, for given trade policies of other countries, a nondiscri- 
minatory barrier reduction is likely to raise real income more than a discrimi- 
natory barrier reduction will probably be of minor importance in practice. 
I now pass on to the choice between  the unilateral and negotiated barrier 
reduction and then to that between discrimination and nondiscrimination. 
2. Preferential reduction of nontariff barriers may result in trade diversion without any trade 
creation. This occurs, e.g., when a global import quota remains unaltered but preferential access 
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1.2  Unilateral or Negotiated Barrier Reduction? 
The usual reason for undertaking liberalization in the context of any inter- 
national agreement (preferential or not), rather than doing it unilaterally, is to 
obtain something in return from trading partners. To use the language of trade 
negotiation, such concessions not  only  provide  a source of  economic  gain 
(including gain in the sense of reduced uncertainty) for the home country but 
also provide within that country the political balance of obvious and concen- 
trated gainers, exporters, to be placed against the obvious and concentrated 
losers, producers of import-competing industries in which there is trade crea- 
tion. 
In addition to seeking concessions with respect to its exports, a government 
may choose to enter negotiated discriminatory  or nondiscriminatory  interna- 
tional agreements so as to constrain its own policies,  even if little is obtained 
as “concessions” from abroad. There are times when governments are able to 
stand back and make assessments in the general interest relatively  free from 
sectional pressures.  External security considerations may provide such an op- 
portunity, or the opportunity may occur soon after an election or after election 
debts have been paid. International  commitments provide a bulwark against 
subsequent  sectional  pressures:  they may  be compared with the wax  in the 
ears of Ulysses’ sailors and the ropes that bound him to the mast so that they 
might all  withstand  the deadly  temptations  of the Sirens. A very important 
variation on the same theme occurs in the United States, where the authority 
has been granted by Congress to the administration to negotiate international 
agreements, which then must be passed or rejected by Congress in their en- 
tirety (the “fast track” authority). This process prevents the tariff-by-tariff log- 
rolling by Congress of the sort that yielded the Smoot-Hawley tariff. Congress 
thereby has constrained itself (Destler 1986, chap. 2), and all tariff reductions 
since the early 1930s in the United States have come about through this pro- 
cess. More generally, the temptations referred to may not only be protection- 
ist: they may also be manifest in loose monetary and fiscal policies that will 
be less sustainable in the presence of international commitments. Also, inter- 
national negotiations themselves direct attention to an overview of economic 
policy that can also help keep pressures for inefficient policies at bay. 
I address later the question of whether preferential or multilateral,  nondis- 
criminatory negotiations are likely to provide the greater constraints. 
1.3  Discrimination versus Nondiscrimination 
The case for nondiscriminatory  multilateralism as compared with preferen- 
tial  schemes can sound  rather  fundamentalist.  It  has been  characterized  as 
such recently by Rudiger Dornbusch in the Economist (Dornbusch 1991, 65). 
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ficult to pin down in practice,  much as it is difficult to pin on individuals the 
effects that their tax avoidance has on respect for (and compliance with) the 
taxation system as a whole. There are public good aspects to compliance with 
a nondiscriminatory  world trading system as there are to compliance with a 
reasonable taxation system. The argument in favor of any particular preferen- 
tial trading arrangement will thus appear to be stronger than the argument for 
preferential arrangements  as a whole.  Each has a systemic effect, to which 
reference was made earlier. 
For the  choice between  discriminatory  and  nondiscriminatory  barrier re- 
duction, the question is whether the extra “something in return”  in a prefer- 
ential  agreement  compensates  for  the  trade  diversion  costs;  working  on  a 
larger canvas, however, governments can also consider the effect on the trad- 
ing system  as a whole  of  the  development of preferential  trading  arrange- 
ments-the  systemic effect-which  can react on them adversely. While small 
countries may gain most from discrimination in their favor, they also stand to 
lose most from the collapse of a multilateral system. It was this systemic effect 
that was in the minds of those who pressed for tight constraints on preferential 
arrangements in the GATT, and I shall return to it later. 
Usually the extra “something in return” for a preferential barrier reduction 
will be a greater decrease in the barriers against the home country’s exports 
than  could otherwise  be  achieved,  although guarantees against increases in 
barriers against its exports are also important in some agreements.  This has 
been so for Canada in its negotiations with the United States: it obtained spe- 
cial dispute settlement procedures in relation to antidumping and countervail- 
ing duty matters, selective exemption from restriction of its exports from safe- 
guard action under the GATT’s Article XIX unless the exports had themselves 
contributed  “importantly”  to the injury of an industry in the United  States, 
and also exemption from any restriction that may be imposed on some exports 
from other countries, for example, meat and  the  enrichment  in the  United 
States of foreign uranium  (Articles  704 and  1102, Chapter  19, and Annex 
902.5 of the agreement; Snape 1988, 12; Snape 1989b, 194). Such guarantees 
are, of course, discriminatory: the provisions for meat and uranium discrimi- 
nate against Australia.  It can be expected that other countries that seek trade 
agreements with the United States will also seek preferential  treatment  with 
respect to contingent protection and dispute settlement. 
Often preferential trading arrangements are part of larger preferential  and 
political agreements-sometimes  a key element of the larger picture as in the 
development of the EEC, sometimes rather incidental and minor as in ASEAN 
(the Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations).  The assessment of  the  total 
gains and losses then may be beyond the calculus of economists, but this does 
not prevent this calculus being used to evaluate some of the economic effects 
of preferences. 
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ment between members of the GATT and any other country3 Amendments to 
the GATT have qualified this by allowing preferences to be extended to devel- 
oping countries  without reciprocity,  while Article XXIV qualifies it by per- 
mitting contracting parties to form preferential arrangements4 provided that: 
(i)  they are in the form of customs unions (free trade internally and common 
barriers externally) or free trade areas (free trade internally and differen- 
tiated  barriers externally) covering “substantially all the trade in prod- 
ucts” or are interim arrangements leading to these ends; 
(ii)  they do not result in raised barriers against nonparticipants (the “general 
incidence” must not be raised in the case of customs unions); and 
(iii)  GATT is notified of the intention to form such arrangements. 
The view taken is clearly that free trade areas and customs unions that cover 
most trade among the members will tend to be more trade creating than di- 
verting so that on balance they are liberalizing. There is also a judgment im- 
plied that the multilateralism of  the GATT as a whole is not undermined by 
such arrangements. 
In fact, very few free trade areas or customs unions have been authorized 
by  the contracting parties to the GATT. Schott (1989, annex A) lists sixty- 
nine preferential trading arrangements considered by the GATT under the pro- 
visions of Article XXIV up to late  1988. Of these,  only four have actually 
been deemed compatible with the Article,  although it should be pointed out 
that,  if  the conditions  of the Article are met, approval is automatic and re- 
quires no special action (Jackson 1969, 582). The conditions in fact have sel- 
dom been met, but no proposed agreement has been prohibited. It can reason- 
ably be said that surveillance has been ineffectual (Schott 1989, 24-26). 
An attempt has been made in the Uruguay Round negotiations to strengthen 
the conditions and surveillance of free trade areas and customs unions. The 
“Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations” tabled for consideration by trade ministers in Brussels in 
December 1990 spoke of the “need to reinforce the effectiveness of the role of 
. . . [the GATT] in reviewing  agreements notified  under Article XXIV, by 
clarifying the criteria and procedures for the assessment of new or enlarged 
agreements, and improving the transparency of all Article XXIV agreements .” 
One of  the  more  significant provisions  was  that the  “reasonable  length  of 
time” for interim arrangements prior to the adoption of free trade among mem- 
bers should not normally exceed ten years. Others were for calculating a com- 
mon  external  tariff  of  a customs  union  to satisfy  the  provisions of  Article 
3. Often overlooked is that Article I provides that any trade concession granted to any other 
country (not just any other contracting party) by a contracting party must be extended uncondi- 
tionally to all other contracting parties. 
4. Article XXIV as written could appear to prohibit free trade or customs union agreements 
between members and nonmembers of the GATT. This is not the way it has been interpreted in 
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XXIV,  for raising  previously  bound  tariffs  on  the  formation  of  a customs 
union, and for more effective review under GATT procedures of the proposed 
barrier reductions and their timetable. But, even if accepted, these provisions 
appear very weak given the flagrant disregard for some of  the constraints of 
Article  XXIV  in the past. It is unlikely  that the  intended  thrust of  Article 
XXIV will be enforced unless a major player  takes a lead.  Such a lead has 
been advocated by Bhagwati (1990, 163), but at this juncture is appears un- 
likely-this  being reflected in the weakness of the Brussels document-par- 
ticularly in view of the current enthusiasm for free trade agreements which are 
unlikely to satisfy a reasonable interpretation of Article XXIV. 
In section  1.2 above it was mentioned  that  international agreements and 
negotiations may have the useful role of constraining domestic policies for the 
general good. Following this line, a question arises whether preferential  or 
nondiscriminatory agreements are more effective in providing the constraints 
on domestic policy. There does not seem to be a general  answer to this.  It 
depends very much on who the partners are in a preferential arrangement and 
on the  nature of the agreements.  It  is probably  easier to  get tight,  binding 
agreements between a small group of similarly minded and endowed countries 
than between a large number of diverse countries. Multilateral agreements are 
more  likely  to contain  words that  are  intended  to mean  different  things to 
different people. But a bilateral agreement between two countries that are not 
well  matched  politically  or economically  is unlikely  to provide  much  of  a 
constraint on the more powerful country. 
Thus, when fully implemented, the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement will 
constrain Israel’s trade policy much more than it will that of the United States. 
The GATT provides  a greater  constraint on the trade  policy  of  the  United 
States than does or will the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement; the opposite is 
probably the situation for Israel. On the other hand, there is not likely to be 
much pressure on most U.S. industries from imports from Israel (particularly 
as many agricultural products are effectively excluded from the agreement), 
and the pressure on the United States to break the agreement is therefore likely 
to be small. 
Where there is a dominant party to an agreement, other parties are linked to 
an economy  that may or may  not prove to be dynamic.  Nondiscrimination 
provides constraints on a country’s industries and its policies from the world 
as a whole; preferential arrangements tie the parties to a significant extent to 
the efficiencies or inefficiencies of the dominant member. It is not clear that 
the tie to the British economy that the Commonwealth preference system pro- 
vided  for some countries  was a net advantage to these countries in the two 
decades or so after World War 11. 
While the United  States is at the center of  current regional initiatives, re- 
gionalism  is  being  advocated  and preferential  agreements  formed between 
countries other than the United States. The Closer Economic Relations agree- 
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arrangements, covering  all commodities, factor  movements, and many  ser- 
vices, while it has no safeguard  provision^.^ It more than satisfies the GATT 
provisions and does not appear to encourage substantial trade diversion, partly 
because both countries have been lowering their external barriers significantly 
against the rest of the world. On the other hand, from a historical perspective 
it  is difficult to believe that  actual and proposed  trade  agreements  between 
Latin American countries will come anywhere near satisfying the GATT pro- 
visions or will provide effective constraints on their policies. Further, there is 
likely to be costly  trade diversion  while external barriers  in Latin America 
remain high. 
Agreements among a small number of  participants may be negotiated more 
quickly  than multilateral  agreements, although  Schott  (1989,  19-20)  ques- 
tions the strength of this point. Negotiations that appear to be going nowhere 
are unlikely  to constrain policies, and this is a problem  associated with the 
stalling of  the Uruguay  Round. While a nondiscriminatory  agreement under 
the GATT  may  be  better  for Latin  American  countries  than  an  agreement 
among themselves or with the United  States, waiting for this option to firm 
may miss the bus of opportunity (Dornbusch  1991, 65).  But the arrival of  the 
GATT bus may not be exogenous: a substantial push by Latin American coun- 
tries may get it moving. Regional negotiations divert negotiating attention and 
muscle  from multilateral  negotiations.  But if  the Uruguay  Round  is unsuc- 
cessful, a set of agreements (or, better,  a single agreement) with the United 
States may be better for these countries than nothing, and better than a purely 
Latin American agreement. 
The completion of  the  single market in Europe in  1992 far exceeds  the 
requirements of the GATT with respect to internal trade, although some ques- 
tions can be raised with respect to external trade, particularly in agriculture, 
textiles, clothing, automobiles, and some electronic products. But the forma- 
tion of such a trading bloc, and the possibility that disputes between it and the 
United States or Japan may be solved on a political bilateral level, with little 
regard  and unfortunate  consequences for other less powerful countries, has 
worried many commentators. 
The greater  are the concentrations of  power,  the less likely  is a general 
rules-based  system to function effectively unless it is established  in a hege- 
monic manner. Yet  rules of general application protect the weak against the 
strong. The GATT as a general set of rules-general  with respect to countries 
and commodities apart from specific exceptions-provides  such protection. 
Effective  constraints  on the actions  of  powerful  countries  are  likely  to be 
achieved  by  international  agreements only  if  these  agreements  incorporate 
other countries, or groups of  countries, of  comparable power.  But between 
5. There are no safeguard provisions with respect to dumping or “fair” trade (cf. Article XIX of 
GATT), and the parties have agreed to abolish all production subsidies that may promote exports 
to each other, (Direct export subsidies are already proscribed by the GATT’s Subsidies Code.) 16  Richard H. Snape 
countries of  comparable power there is always a temptation to settle outside 
the agreement:  to preserve  the  agreement  and the benefits  it provides,  this 
temptation  needs to be resisted, particularly when the relevant countries are 
large. 
1.4  Hub-and-Spoke  “Free” Trade Agreements 
it can be argued that what the architects of the GATT had in mind in fram- 
ing Article XXIV were agreements like the European Common Market with 
respect  to most  industrial  (although  not  agricultural)  goods,  in  which  the 
members have reduced barriers progressively without generally raising them 
against the rest of the world (except for voluntary export restraints on a num- 
ber of  sensitive products) and in which new members have been added from 
time to time. On the other hand, the arrangements for agriculture in the EEC 
are clearly not consistent with this intention. 
While the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement is one of the cleanest from a 
GATT perspective, it is most unlikely that the GATT architects envisaged a 
set of bilateral agreements between a central country and others: the hub-and- 
spoke model that could develop around the United States.6  While Canada has 
sought to be included  in the U.S. negotiations  with Mexico, it appears un- 
likely that one agreement will cover the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 
The U.S. Congress has ensured that new countries will not be added to exist- 
ing bilateral  agreements without  its explicit  approval.  Differing  labor costs 
and conditions and environmentalist pressures in the United States, will make 
it  very  difficult  to incorporate  Mexico into  the  existing  U.S.-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement or to negotiate an agreement with Mexico that is close in its 
provisions to that with Canada. While Canada may also negotiate a pact with 
Mexico, it  is unlikely  that  the three  deals could  be covered by  one agree- 
ment-or,  if they could be, it would in all probability require different provi- 
sions covering  at least  some of  the trade between  the three pairs of  partici- 
pants, perhaps with lengthy transitional arrangements. Similar considerations 
arise with respect to Chile, which could be next in line for negotiations with 
the United  States, and they would  apply even more strongly with respect to 
other Latin American countries, particularly as their macroeconomic policies 
would make it more difficult for free trade with the United  States to be sus- 
tained. A hub-and-spoke network  appears  more likely than  a multicountry 
free trade agreement, at least for a lengthy transitional period. 
The United States, along with Britain and Germany, was central to a net- 
work of bilateral arrangements in the 193Os, but, in sharp contrast to the oth- 
ers, the U.S.  arrangements were clearly trade liberalizing,  albeit from very 
high tariff levels. It is often stated that it was out of the U.S. arrangements that 
the GATT was born-“that  GATT was the Trade Agreements Program writ 
6.  For analyses of hub-and-spoke systems, see Wonnacott (1990) and Park and Yo0 (1989). 17  Discrimination, Regionalism, and GATT 
large” (Diebold  1988,  1 1)-although  this perhaps gives insufficient credit to 
James Meade and others on the other side of the Atlantic.’  These U.S. bilat- 
eral agreements differed in important ways from the current U.S. carrot-and- 
stick approach  in that (i) they  were not generally accompanied by negative 
discrimination, actual or threatened, and (ii) the barrier reductions were quite 
limited  in  product  coverage  but  were  nondiscriminatory.  The  negotiations 
covered products  of  which  the  United  States and  the  partner country  were 
principal suppliers, and there was careful product selection and specification 
to ensure that the parties  were the principal  suppliers.  But then the  barrier 
reductions were not restricted to the partners but were extended to all coun- 
tries,  unconditionally  (Diebold  1988, 7-1  1).*  Minor existing suppliers  and, 
more important, new suppliers could then benefit from the opening of trade. 
A hub-and-spoke model centered on the United States would differ from the 
EEC model  in that  it would comprise  separate bilateral  arrangements,  and 
additional countries  would not  be expected to enter under the  same condi- 
tions. It would differ from the 1930s U.S. model in that the negotiated conces- 
sions  would  not  be  extended  to others on  an  unconditional  most-favored- 
nation basis. Because of the careful product specification, new agreements in 
the  1930s did not tend to undermine significantly the preferences granted in 
existing agreements; in contrast, the hub-and-spoke model with wide product 
coverage involves significant undermining of this sort as new bilateral or mul- 
tilateral agreements are negotiated. (This point has more force with respect to 
explicit positive preferences than to commitments not to impose restrictions .) 
If  countries  B  and  C  have  free trade  agreements  with  country  A, what 
should their relations be with each other? If the agreements were truly and 
fully  free trade agreements, then  it would be relatively  easy to have a free 
trade agreement  embracing all three, and this  would  be  GATT consistent. 
Again,  if  the agreement between A and B were an open agreement, C could 
join and have the same relations with both A and R. But where preferential 
agreements are not open and do not embrace all trade, it becomes much more 
difficult to devise agreements between parties. 
While each of the partners with the United States, in a hub-and-spoke sys- 
tem may benefit from its own bilateral relationship, an important question is 
what effect such a network will have on the multilateral  trading system as a 
whole. In considering the prospect of a free trade agreement between Mexico 
and the United States, Ron Wonnacott points out that there is a risk that, “in 
responding magnanimously to requests for bilateral agreements that are in its 
interests and, at least initially, in those of the applicant nations,  the United 
States could inadvertently be creating a discriminatory,  inefficient, hub-and- 
7. See Meade’s proposal for an International Commercial Union, reproduced as an appendix to  .-  .. 
Culbert (1987). 
8. The United States did retaliate against Germany and Australia by withholding most-favored- 
nation extension of concessions negotiated with others (Diebold 1988: 9; Copland and Janes 1937, 
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spoke trading  structure that  will be  unnecessarily  damaging to its partners 
and  may  erode prospects  for future  multilateral  liberalization”  (Wonnacott 
1990, 2). 
Each additional country added to a hub-and-spoke system lessens the gains 
for those already  in it, with the exception  of the hub country, for each new 
entrant reduces the  advantage  that the others  have  in trading  with  the hub 
country. It is only the hub country that does not have its sourcing, whether for 
industrial inputs or final products, distorted by trade barriers within the hub- 
and-spoke system. If “rim” countries wish to have a network of agreements 
among themselves to lessen the discrimination, the number of possible agree- 
ments increases rapidly as the number of  countries increases: a system of  six 
countries around one hub has a possible twenty-one bilateral agreements. But 
the more countries that are in the system, the greater the incentive for outsid- 
ers to join. This incentive for outsiders to join also applies to a single GATT- 
consistent  free  trade  agreement covering  several countries;  however,  while 
embracing a multicountry  free trade arrangement probably moves the global 
system closer to multilateralism, in adding more spokes to the hub bilateral- 
ism is m~ltiplied.~ 
The complexity of  the system and of the relationships it would bring could 
be quite damaging. Each agreement would involve discrimination against out- 
siders, in a different manner,  and rules of  origin and content  (which could 
differ in the various agreements, unlike a customs union or multicountry free 
trade agreement) would be of considerable importance. Furthermore, should 
a network develop, many if not most of the agreements are unlikely to satisfy 
a reasonable interpretation of  Article XXIV of the GATT, but, as past experi- 
ence has shown with respect to the enforcement of this Article, this is unlikely 
to  prevent their adoption, particularly  as the erstwhile leader of  multilateral- 
ism, the United States, would be involved. If the requirements of the Article 
were truly met with respect to free trade covering “substantially all trade in 
products,”  it would be relatively  easy to move to a multicountry  free trade 
agreement: it is the deviations from a really free trade agreement that lead to 
separate bilateral agreements. One source of difficulty lies in the favored treat- 
ment that  countries would  seek (following  the Canadian  example) with re- 
spect to the U.S. safeguard provisions against both fair and unfair trade and 
dispute  settlement. These provisions  could well  vary  with each spoke. The 
hub-and-spoke  model could well bring substantial damage to the multilateral 
system as it has developed over the last forty-odd years. 
There is another factor involved. The ability of a country’s administration 
to focus on various negotiations  and the supply of trade negotiating staff are 
limited, even in the United States. Distraction of attention can only be harmful 
to the Uruguay  Round of  multilateral trade negotiations,  which ground to a 
9. For more extensive considerations of  these points, see Wonnacott (1990) and Park and Yo0 
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halt last December in Brussels and need full attention if they are to be revived. 
This applies not only to the United States but also to its potential partners, 
who may see a deal with the United States as an alternative to Uruguay. 
1.5  Regionalism without Discrimination? 
I have stated above that there can be no trade preference for one country 
without discrimination against others.  lo Is there a role for trade agreements 
between groups of  countries that fall short of the multilateral but that do not 
involve discrimination? Of  course almost anything  that facilitates trade be- 
tween a restricted set of  countries will imply some trade diversion as well as 
trade creation. This can apply to treaties of friendship, commerce, and navi- 
gation, which  aim at facilitating  trade between the  signatories without  dis- 
criminating against other countries. Similarly, many if not most of the actions 
being taken within Europe to complete the internal market, such as recogni- 
tion of  standards, removal of internal customs posts, and the like, will have 
incidental trade-diverting effects for the rest of the world even though their net 
effects will almost certainly increase global efficiency and diversion is not the 
intention (Emerson  1989; Snape 1989a). There will be diversion of existing 
trade even if  existing (or threatened)  negative discrimination  is removed be- 
tween countries. In this case, both the trade diversion and the trade creation 
would  be economically beneficial for the country removing  the discrimina- 
tion, and it is again likely to improve global efficiency, but it would adversely 
affect those trading partners that had not been discriminated against. Australia 
and some other countries concluded agreements with Japan in the late 1950s 
that aimed at the removal of such discrimination. 
But there is probably no advocate of multilateralism and nondiscrimination 
who would argue that there should be no agreements with economic implica- 
tions between  countries unless the benefits  are extended to others. The line 
drawn by  the GATT with respect  to trade barrier  agreements  has been de- 
scribed  above:  free trade  internally  on  most  goods with  unraised  barriers 
against the rest of the world. 
Bilaterally  negotiated  tariff reductions  that  are extended  on an uncondi- 
tional  most-favored-nation  basis  to all  other members of  the GATT (or all 
countries)  also clearly  pass GATT rules of  nondiscrimination.  However,  in 
practice, the product selection and specification that might be finely drawn to 
prevent free riding (as in the U.S. bilateral agreements in the 1930s) could run 
into GATT problems. It is no accident that Article I of the GATT refers to 
concessions that when granted to one contracting party must be granted to all 
contracting parties for “like products,”  rather than for “the same product” or 
for “identical products.” Tariff classifications cannot be drawn so as to make 
10. Regionalism without discrimination is a theme of  Drysdale (1988, esp. 237ff.) and Drys- 
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contrived distinctions between products from different sources.’’ Such agree- 
ments would be GATT consistent  in their nondiscrimination  between coun- 
tries (and in this respect are less discriminatory than agreements under Article 
XXIV) but could fail on grounds of  product  specification and/or breadth of 
product coverage. 
All the GATT rounds of multilateral trade negotiations until the Kennedy 
Round  proceeded  on this  principal-supplier  basis  but  within  a  multilateral 
context, the results of the whole set of bilateral agreements being generalized 
without discrimination  except that implied by  product selection, within that 
allowed by “like products.”  GATT would  still appear to be the most appro- 
priate forum in which to negotiate  such nondiscriminatory  deals. Effort de- 
voted  to stand-alone  bilateral  or regional  negotiations  is likely  to be effort 
diverted from multilateral negotiations. 
The discussions  and  negotiations  that have been undertaken  over the last 
two years  under the  Asia  Pacific  Economic  Cooperation  (APEC) initiative 
have been aimed at trade facilitation among the participants with a minimum 
of discrimination against others.  I* One of  the principles adopted at the initial 
ministerial  meeting  in November  1989, as set out in the “Chairman’s Sum- 
mary” of that meeting, was that “consistent with the interests of Asia Pacific 
economies, cooperation should be directed at strengthening the open multilat- 
eral trading  system: it  should  not  involve the formation  of  a trading bloc.” 
Much of  the focus so far, apart from attempting to push the Uruguay Round 
along, has been on  the exchange of  information, marine resource conserva- 
tion, and like matters; the adoption of  common standards in some areas such 
as telecommunications equipment is also under consideration. 
In some quarters, a “Pacific Round” of trade negotiations and barrier reduc- 
tions  has  been  proposed,  the  negotiated  barrier  decreases to be  extended 
to  others  countries  unconditionally.  Drysdale  and  Garnaut  ( 1989)  argue 
that, provided  Latin American  countries  are included,  the trade patterns are 
such that  free riding by other countries  should not be a major problem, the 
“tendency [being] for barriers to intra-Pacific trade to be highest in commod- 
ities  and  markets  in  which  other  Pacific  economies are  competitive  sup- 
pliers”  (p.  251).  They suggest  that  the  “Pacific  Round” negotiations  take 
place at a “time of  crisis.” Collapse of the Uruguay Round and U.S. congres- 
sional protectionist  pressure could  provide  the crisis; APEC could  provide 
the forum. 
11. In an important decision, a GATT panel concluded the Spain should not impose different 
tariffs on Arabica and Robusta coffee, a difference that discriminated against Brazil (GATT 1985, 
Article I, p. 4). 
12. Those countries participating in the discussions are the ASEAN six (Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) together with Australia, Canada, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United States; a formula for incorporating the Peoples 
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1.6  Conclusion 
The case for multilateralism  and nondiscrimination, particularly for small 
countries, is as strong as ever. Discrimination  implies politicization.  If trade 
liberalization  is to proceed  through  international  negotiation  and  commit- 
ment-and  for many countries there are reasons for it to do so-nondiscri- 
minatory agreements and rules of general application protect the weak. 
There is a strong temptation  to attempt  to settle particular  trade disputes 
and concerns bilaterally with specific rather than generalized reciprocity.  But 
whether these settlements involve the lowering of  specific trade barriers or the 
giving of commitments not to raise them, the efficient multilateral trading sys- 
tem is best preserved by extending any concessions to other traders. Uncon- 
ditional most-favored-nation  status is the surest way to do this. For preferen- 
tial  arrangements, the least damage (or the most good) will be done to the 
multilateral system by trade agreements that follow the rules of Article XXIV 
of  the GATT strictly and that are open to new participants on the same condi- 
tions  as the  old. The hub-and-spoke  system that  could  develop around  the 
United States should it pursue more preferential trading agreements could sig- 
nificantly  damage the multilateral trading  system that the  United  States has 
worked hard to develop over the last forty-odd years. 
For matters and disputes that embrace a limited range of products, countries 
may be unwilling or politically unable to take the unconditional most-favored- 
nation path when the issues are treated in isolation. Here the best way may be 
to revive the procedures  of early GATT rounds-to  have modest objectives 
concerning  a limited  range of  issues and to conduct negotiations  primarily 
between pairs or among groups of countries that have strong interests in par- 
ticular  issues, but  to do this  in  a  multilateral  context. With  enough  issues 
considered and a sufficient number of participants in attendance, the conces- 
sions negotiated could be extended to all on an unconditional most-favored- 
nation basis. GATT rounds do not have to encompass everything, nor do they 
have  to last  forever.  A  more modest  but  more  frequent  set of  negotiations 
could complement the blockbusters like the Uruguay Round and help enforce 
the day-to-day application of nondiscrimination,  on which the general agree- 
ment and its multilateral benefits ultimately depend. 
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Comment  Koichi Hamada 
This is an excellent paper, implemented with balanced judgment and rigorous 
logic. Economic, political, and legal aspects of  the difficulties created by dis- 
criminatory practices and regionalism are carefully discussed, and the merit 
of the multinational approach through the GATT is forcefully presented.  In 
my first reading, I felt as if I had found a trace of  some possible Australian 
concern that it might become a potential outsider to various possible regional 
Koichi Hamada is professor of  economics at Yale  University and a research associate of  the 
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agreements. The author’s presentation at the conference convinced me, how- 
ever, that I had overstretched my imagination. 
In the ideal world  where neither negotiation costs nor domestic political 
constraints for trade representatives exist, it is easy to agree with the author 
on the importance of the overall approach based on the well-defined GATT 
rule. In this sense, I find many of his arguments quite convincing. Difficulties 
arise because we do not live in such an environment. Here, for the sake of 
argument, I would like to play the role of an antagonist and see how strong a 
case I can make for bilateral agreements and regionalism against multilateral 
agreements. 
To  begin with, I would like to distinguish between two types of  bilateral 
agreements. The first type works to restrict trade at the expense of consumers. 
For example,  voluntary export restraints (VERs), most ordinary market ar- 
rangements (OMAs), and compulsory import expansions (CTEs) between two 
countries fall into this category. Not only do they violate the principle of free 
trade, but they also represent a temptation to both countries because their in- 
centive structure is such that both exporters and import competitors are eager 
to agree on these arrangements at the expense of  consumers. We  should be 
much concerned with this type of bilateralism. 
On the other hand, in this paper the word bilateralism often refers to the 
creation of a free trade area that involves tariff reductions and the elimination 
of other trade barriers between two trading partners. This second type of bi- 
lateral agreement certainly exerts trade diversion effects on the rest of  the 
world. In contrast to the first type, this type of regionalism has at least favor- 
able efficiency consequences within the region. Hence, it can be regarded as a 
piecemeal approach to free trade. I think that there is something to be said for 
this kind of  approach when the multinational way  of achieving free trade is 
made difficult for political or other reasons. 
My  second point is about the number of  negotiators. Multilateral negotia- 
tions and agreements often require many meetings or a creation of new insti- 
tutions and therefore involve substantial costs.  Often bilateral negotiations 
and agreements could save these costs.  It would be an  interesting study to 
compare the negotiation costs required for bilateral agreements with  those 
required for multilateral agreements or agreements made through international 
organizations.  Incidentally, the study of  possible Parkinson’s law effects in 
international organizations would be another research agenda. 
Third, a thought experiment can be conducted by relying on the logic of the 
Coase theorem in law and economics. The theorem states that,  if  we  have 
environmental problems,  mutual negotiations  seeking Pareto improvement 
would sustain the system. Suppose that there are only three countries-A,  B, 
and C-in  the world, and suppose that A and B first create a free trade area 
that is mutually beneficial. Is it possible to devise an international arrange- 
ment  to compensate the loss to C? The answer to this question, however, 
would be that it is difficult. Another question to be explored is whether it is 24  Richard H. Snape 
more difficult for C to join the agreement and for the system to create a free 
trade world than it is for the three countries to create such a system from the 
outset in the absence of the free trade area between A and B? The answers to 
these questions depend on the economic and political structures of these coun- 
tries. 
If  we argue Snape’s point in reverse,  we may ask the following question. 
Suppose that there is a free trade area between A and B. Will it then be bene- 
ficial for country C if the free trade area is divided again into A and B? There 
are cases, as an analogy to dividing a monopoly  firm, where dividing pays, 
but this would not always be the case. 
Finally,  we  should  keep  in  mind  the distinction  between  the  normative 
question  of  international  lawmaking, that  is, the question of what the ideal 
trade regime is, and the positive question of  how the trade regime actually 
emerges or changes. For the normative question, Snape’s argument may be 
mostly correct, but in the actual world we must negotiate under political con- 
straints. Given such consequences, piecemeal policy-making could be a faster 
way of  achieving  integration as well as a more efficient world market econ- 
omy. It is necessary, of course, to devise an incentive mechanism to keep any 
regional integration from developing into a protectionist region or a “fortress.” 